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NOTES
SKINNER v RAIL WAY LABOR EXECUTIVES'
ASSOCIATION AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT WARRANT-PROBABLE CAUSE
REQUIREMENT: SPECIAL NEEDS EXCEPTION
CREATING A SHAKEDOWN INSPECTION?
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution' protects per-
sons from government intrusion in two manners. First, the government can-
not perform unreasonable searches or seizures.2 Second, the government
can obtain a search warrant only after demonstrating probable cause to be-
lieve that the person or thing to be seized is in the place to be searched.' By
limiting the government's ability to search, the fourth amendment protects
persons from arbitrary, and therefore unreasonable, intrusions.4 To qualify
I. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures .... " Id. A full-scale search requires a search warrant issued "upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." Id.
2. Id. The Constitution does not define what constitutes an "unreasonable" search, how-
ever, creating problems in validating a government intrusion. See Note, California v. Green-
wood: Discarding the Traditional Approach to the Search and Seizure of Garbage, 38 CATH.
U.L. REV. 543 (1989) (citing to Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake: Toward an
Expanded Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGs L.J. 645, 687
(1985)).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Supreme Court uses some "quantum of evidence" to
determine probable cause, regardless of whether the probable cause deals with a search or an
arrest. Thus, when courts rely on previous case holdings, they do so without concern for
whether the case deals with probable cause to arrest or probable cause to search. I W.R.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.1(b) (2d ed. 1987). Just as it does not define the term
"reasonable," the Constitution does not define what constitutes "probable cause." One expla-
nation of probable cause is a "substantial probability that the invasions involved in the search
will be justified by discovery of offending items." Comment, Search and Seizure in The
Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 664, 687 (1961).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c) (requiring that a search warrant
be issued by a federal magistrate or state judge only on a showing of probable cause); see also
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) (the Court explained the importance of a neutral
and detached magistrate). The officer preoccupied with the crime detection profession is too
involved in the government's right to search to adequately guard the individual's right to pri-
vacy, thus resulting in the proverbial fox guarding the henhouse. See id. at 14; see also United
States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932) (officers actively engaged in capturing suspected
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for fourth amendment protection, however, a person must be the subject of a
government search.5 Thus, courts must determine that there is, in fact, a
search and that the government is sufficiently involved before constitutional
questions may be raised.6
The protections the fourth amendment provides against unreasonable
searches remain viable only as long as courts continue to observe them. His-
torically, however, courts have found special exceptions to these fourth
amendment protections. In particular, courts have encroached upon some
of these constitutional protections during crisis situations.7 A contemporary
example of this phenomenon developed as a result of the American public's
growing awareness of the nation's drug crisis. In fact, Congress has referred
to the drug crisis as a "war".' The United States Supreme Court, which
often defers to Congress' power to implement wartime legislation, 9 appears
to be moving toward extending this deference to the "war on drugs" by up-
holding laws seemingly necessary and reasonable to combat this social prob-
criminals are less likely to deliberate over the lawfulness of a search than informed, disinter-
ested magistrates).
5. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The Weeks Court found that a
United States Marshal's warrantless entry into Weeks' home and seizure of his personal papers
violated Weeks' fourth amendment privacy rights. Id. at 398. The Court held that the fourth
amendment restricts United States courts and federal officials, thereby protecting individuals
from "unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law." Id. at 392. The Weeks
decision protected people only from the Federal Government and federal agencies, and not
from local officers. Id. at 398. The Supreme Court broadened the scope of the fourth amend-
ment to include protection against unreasonable searches and seizures by state officials in
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
6. The Supreme Court determined that drug testing private employees in an industry
heavily regulated by the government constitutes a search requiring fourth amendment protec-
tion. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 613-18 (1989). Similarly,
where the government acts as an employer, drug testing its employees is a search requiring
fourth amendment protection. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656, 665 (1989); see also Comment, The Constitutionality of Federal Employee Drug Testing.
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 38 AM. U.L. REV. 109, 111-12, 115-17
(1988) (courts have found drug testing, via urine and blood testing, to be a fourth amendment
search; presidential attention to the national drug problem and executive order to federal agen-
cies equates to sufficient government action); Exec. Order No. 12,564, 51 Fed. Reg. 32,889
(1986) (requiring all federal agencies to develop drug-elimination programs, including
mandatory testing of federal employees).
7. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
8. See United States Senate News Release (Aug. 1, 1989) (discussing approval of Mc-
Connell/Kerry amendment to expand the air war on drugs); see also THE WHITE HOUSE,
NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY (Sept. 1989) (discussing strategy for the war against
illegal drug use).
9. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219-20; Hirabayashi. 320 U.S. at 95.
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association
lem.' O Perceptions that the national drug crisis infiltrates virtually every
type of business in both the public and private sectors have led to an increase
in governmental searches through drug testing."
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association, 2 the United States
Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of employee drug testing
when an employer has not first obtained a warrant and established probable
cause or reasonable suspicion. 3 Skinner involved a suit by railroad labor
unions to enjoin employers from testing railroad employees, via blood, urine,
and breath samples, for the presence of drugs and alcohol.' 4 Although rail-
road employees work in private industry, they are subject to heavy govern-
mental regulation.' 5 This heavy regulation functions as the requisite
governmental involvement opening the door to constitutional challenges
concerning violations of the fourth amendment.
16
Congress initially authorized drug and alcohol testing of private railroad
employees by empowering the Secretary of Transportation to draft regula-
tions promoting railroad safety.' 7 Based on the results of the Federal Rail-
road Administration's (FRA) study of drug and alcohol abuse by railroad
personnel,' 8 the FRA published regulations mandating post-accident testing
and authorizing railroads to test employees where reasonable suspicion of
10. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633. Historically, exercises of legislative war powers have in-
volved temporary emergency measures employed to protect from outside invasions. Woods v.
Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 141 (1948) (power to control rent). "[T]he war power
includes the power to 'remedy the evils which have arisen from its rise and progress.'" Id.
(quoting Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 161 (1919) (post
World War I prohibition law)). Here, the drug war deals with a perceived permanent measure
against an inside invasion.
11. See Adams, Random Drug Testing of Government Employees: A Constitutional Proce-
dure, 54 U. CHi. L. REV. 1335, 1337 (1987) (many private businesses already utilize random
urinalysis; these companies include: IBM, Exxon, Federal Express, United Airlines, AT&T,
The New York Times, and Kidder, Peabody & Company). Private employees, however, do
not enjoy the protections of the fourth amendment unless their employer's drug testing
amounts to a government search. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614; United States v. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. 109, 113-14 (1984); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971).
12. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
13. Id. at 637-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Although addressing the constitutionality of
employer drug testing of employees for the first time, the United States Supreme Court had
previously addressed the search of a person. See infra note 83.
14. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 612.
15. See id. at 614-16. On the same day, the Supreme Court dealt with the search of a
government employee in the companion case, National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), and upheld the drug testing in both cases.
16. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
17. Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-458, § 202, 84 Stat. 971, 971
(codified at 45 U.S.C. § 431(a) (1988)).
18. 50 Fed. Reg. 31,508-09, 31,514-25 (1985).
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drug or alcohol abuse exists. 9 The regulations provide that reasonable sus-
picion is necessary for authorized testing. 20  Mandatory testing, as pre-
scribed in the regulations, does not require an antecedent finding of probable
cause or reasonable suspicion.2 '
The Railway Labor Executives' Association (RLEA), a railroad workers'
association created to represent railroad employees, filed suit against the Sec-
retary of Transportation in the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of California to enjoin enforcement of the regulations.22 In
particular, the RLEA challenged subpart C of the regulations requiring
post-accident testing, and subpart D authorizing testing for cause.23
RLEA's basis for challenging the constitutionality of the regulations was
that the regulations violated the fourth amendment's protection against un-
reasonable searches and seizures.2 4 The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the Secretary of Transportation. 25 Although agreeing
that railroad employees have a fourth amendment right to protect their bod-
ies against government intrusion, the court held that the government's inter-
est in public safety outweighed the personal interests of the employees. 2
6
RLEA lost its suit in the district court, but the lower court's decision was
stayed pending appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.2 ' At the government's request, however, the Supreme Court va-
cated the stay28 and the regulations became effective in February of 1986,
two years before the Ninth Circuit was able to hear the case.2 9
19. 49 C.F.R. § 219 (1989). Subpart C mandates post-accident testing by way of taking
blood and urine samples from all crew members involved with a train having a specified train
accident or fatal incident within the definitions of the regulations. Id. § 219.210. Sanctions for
refusing to give such samples include a presumption of impairment. Id. §§ 219.203, 219.213,
219.309(b) (1989). Subpart D authorizes the railroads to require particular employees to sub-
mit to breath or urine tests when there is reasonable suspicion of alcohol or drug abuse, in-
volvement in other types of railroad accidents, or in violating a railroad operating rule. Id.
§ 219.301. The FRA proposes to rely primarily on the blood samples under subpart C, but
must also rely on urine samples where employees cannot be transported quickly enough to a
medical facility before presence of certain drugs is totally eliminated from the blood. 49 Fed.
Reg. 24,291 (1984).
20. 49 C.F.R. § 219.301.
21. Id. § 219.201.
22. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 577 & n.I (9th Cir. 1988)
rev'd sub nom. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
23. Id. at 577; see supra note 19.
24. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 579.
25. Id. at 577.
26. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 612.
27. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 577.
28. Dole v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 474 U.S. 1099 (1986).
29. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 577; see American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651
F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Ga. 1986) (reasonable suspicion required to test federal police officers);
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A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on recent
lower court decisions concerning employee testing30 and on recent Supreme
Court precedent, 3 reversed the district court's decision.32 The Ninth Cir-
cuit applied a two-pronged reasonableness test to determine whether the
blood and urine testing authorized by the regulations was reasonable within
the meaning of the fourth amendment.33 In applying this standard to the
FRA authorized testing, the Ninth Circuit first determined that the fourth
amendment required particularized suspicion for the search to be "justified
at its inception.",34 Second, the court indicated that blood and urine testing
to establish drug use was not "reasonably related in scope to the circum-
stances which justified the interference."
3 1
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the
Ninth Circuit's decision. 6 The majority,37 finding a "special needs' 38 ex-
ception to the warrant and probable cause requirements, held that the regu-
lations were reasonable under the fourth amendment, notwithstanding the
absence of both probable cause and reasonable or particularized suspicion.39
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, opined that the government's
compelling safety interest outweighed the individual's privacy interest."
Moreover, the majority found that the employees' diminished expectations
Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (individualized suspicion
required to test fire fighters), aff'd, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988); Patchogue-Medford Con-
gress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 70 N.Y.2d 57, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456, 510 N.E.2d 325 (1987)
(particularized suspicion required to test teachers).
30. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 587-88 (citing Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1277 v. Sun-
line Transit Agency, 663 F. Supp. 1560 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 661 F.
Supp. 578 (N.D. Ohio 1987)).
31. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 587 (citing O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987); New Jersey
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)).
32. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 592.
33. Id. at 587.
34. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20).
35. Id. at 588 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
36. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
37. Justice Kennedy delivered the majority opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White, Blackmun, O'Connor, and Scalia. Id. at 605. Justice Stevens
joined in the majority opinion except for the portions of Part III that found the regulation a
significant deterrent to drug and alcohol use. Id. at 634-35 (Stevens, J., concurring); see infra
note 253 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Stevens' concurring opinion).
38. The Court has recently recognized "special needs" to justify abolishing the probable
cause requirement. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 878 (1987) (the need to preserve
the probation system's deterrent effect); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987) (the
need for efficiency in the workplace); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (the need
to maintain order and safety in schools). For a discussion of the special needs exception, see
infra notes 165-200 and accompanying text.
39. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624, 633-34.
40. Id. at 633.
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of privacy, stemming from their involvement in a heavily regulated industry,
further minimized individual privacy interests. 4' also the Court asserted
that the railroads' standard practice of requiring periodic physical examina-
tions for specific employees as a continuing safety goal diminished the rail-
road employees' expectations of privacy.42
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, issued an elaborate dissent on
the evils of "allow[ing] basic constitutional rights to fall prey to momentary
emergencies." 43 Justice Marshall pointed to historical instances where war
emergencies prompted the government to dispense with constitutional rights
only to regret such actions later." Although Justice Marshall acknowledged
that some cases have upheld searches without particularized suspicion,4 5
Justice Marshall distinguished those cases as never intruding on the per-
son.' Justice Marshall adamantly rejected the majority's special needs ex-
ception to the warrant and probable cause requirements, criticizing the
majority's finding that some special need beyond ordinary law enforcement
makes the warrant and probable cause requirements impractical."'
This Note reviews the constitutional underpinnings of the fourth amend-
ment search and seizure clause and the historical setting at the time of its
adoption. Next, this Note traces the Supreme Court's interpretation of both
the fourth amendment's reasonableness requirement and its probable cause
and search warrant requirements. The Note examines the exceptions to the
search warrant and probable cause requirements that have developed, partic-
ularly the administrative search exception and the recent extrapolation of
the special needs exception. Further, this Note reviews the special needs
exception to the fourth amendment which, coupled with the perceived na-
tional drug crisis, paved the way for employee drug testing and culminated
in the United States Supreme Court's decision in Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Association.48 Finally, this Note analyzes the Skinner opinion
and its impact on government and private sector employees. This Note con-
cludes that although an employee drug testing program may be conducted in
a reasonable manner consistent with fourth amendment safeguards, the
FRA's drug testing regulations do not pass traditional fourth amendment
scrutiny.
41. Id. at 627.
42. Id.; see also 49 Fed. Reg. 24,278-79 (1984).
43. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 635 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
44. Id.
45. The Court has upheld brief, routine, administrative, and nonintrusive searches as rea-
sonable, absent even individualized suspicion. Id. at 637-38 & n.2.
46. Id. at 638.
47. Id. at 636-37.
48. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
[Vol. 40:117
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association
I. CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNINGS OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A. Fourth Amendment
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects persons
from unreasonable searches and seizures of their "persons, houses, papers,
and effects." 49 Additionally, the fourth amendment requires that search
warrants be issued only upon a determination of probable cause, and further,
that the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized be partic-
ularly described." °
While the Framers' intent in drafting the fourth amendment is not clear, 5 1
they were likely responding to Henry VIII's and later English monarchs'
exercise of virtually unlimited search power as a means of restricting the
freedom of the press in England.52 In addition, the issuance of general war-
rants, which allowed the British government to exercise its search authority
arbitrarily in England as well as in the American colonies, surely influenced
the Framers. 3 English customs agents in America were using general war-
rants to enter buildings and search for smuggled goods.54 The English
courts eventually prohibited the flagrant exercise of police power through
general warrants." Controversy in America over the use of general war-
rants continued until the Revolutionary War.56 With such controversies in
mind, the Framers authored the fourth amendment to limit government offi-
cials' practice of breaking, entering, and "ransacking" 57 a person or a per-
son's effects.
B. United States Supreme Court Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment
For almost a century after the fourth amendment's creation, the United
States Supreme Court had no opportunity to interpret it.58 In 1886, how-
ever, the Supreme Court heard the seminal case on search and seizure, Boyd
v. United States. 9 In Boyd, the federal government charged the defendant
49. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
50. Id.
51. See supra note 2.
52. See I W.R. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 1.1(a), at 3.
53. Id. at 4.
54. Id.
55. In 1765, the most famous case, Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1909), held a
verdict of trespass against a general warrant.
56. See, e.g., I W.R. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 1.1(a), at 4.
57. Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 814.
58. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake: Toward an Expanded Vision of the
Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 670-71 (1985).
59. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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with illegally importing certain goods into the United States.' Boyd chal-
lenged the constitutionality of a government order to produce invoices show-
ing the quantity and value of goods.6" Although the government order was
found unconstitutional on the grounds that the proceedings violated Boyd's
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination,6 2 the Boyd Court con-
sidered the fourth and fifth amendments together. Specifically, the Court
stated that compelling Boyd to produce his private papers amounted to com-
pelling Boyd to be a witness against himself; therefore, the order resulted in
an unreasonable search and seizure.63
Once the Supreme Court began to find violations of the fourth amend-
ment, the Court substantiated its holdings by mandating that any evidence
gathered as a result of an unconstitutional search be inadmissible in criminal
proceedings.' In Weeks v. United States,65 the Supreme Court considered
the propriety of a warrantless search of Weeks' home. The search produced
evidence to convict Weeks in federal court of using the mails to transmit
lottery tickets.6 6 The Weeks Court found the search and seizure unlawful,
and therefore held that the evidence could not be used in trial.67 While the
Supreme Court established the inadmissibility of evidence obtained in viola-
tion of the fourth amendment in Weeks, the Court had yet to interpret what
constituted a fourth amendment violation.
1. The Fourth Amendment's Reasonableness Requirement
The fourth amendment protects persons and their effects from unreasona-
ble searches and seizures. 61 In order to distinguish reasonable from unrea-
60. Id. at 617.
61. Id. at 618.
62. Id. at 634-35.
63. Id.
64. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 386.
67. Id. at 398. This restriction on the federal courts was extended to the state courts
almost fifty years later in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), where the Supreme Court held
that all evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment is inadmissible in any court.
Id. at 659-60.
68. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The reasonableness clause first requires a determination of
whether a search or seizure has actually occurred. If a search or seizure within the meaning of
the fourth amendment has occurred, a second determination must be made concerning the
reasonableness of the search or seizure. See Comment, Employee Drug Testing: Guilty Until
Proven Innocent 52 Mo. L. REV. 625, 635 (1987). The Supreme Court, in Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967), determined that a search within the meaning of the fourth
amendment occurred when the governmental intrusion infringed upon an individual's expecta-
tion of privacy. Justice Harlan, in his concurrence, posited a two-part test to determine
whether the government's intrusion infringed upon an individual's expectation of privacy.
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sonable searches, the Supreme Court developed a standard that balances the
government's interests against the intrusion upon an individual's privacy in-
terests.69 Examples of government interests include crime control and
safety.7" Using the balancing test, the Court weighs the extent of the intru-
sion on the individual's privacy, whether minimally or highly intrusive,
against the government's interest, whether weak or compelling, to determine
the reasonableness of the search.7 '
One factor bolstering the reasonableness of a search or seizure is the prior
procurement of a warrant. Government officials may obtain search warrants
from magistrates only after supplying specific information concerning who
or what is to be searched or seized.7 2 Significant in the warrant process is
the fact that an impartial magistrate determines whether probable cause ex-
ists to believe an offense was committed, and whether the offense justifies the
search or seizure. 3 Supreme Court precedent favors searches pursuant to
warrants because a determination of reasonableness is made prior to the
search by a "neutral and detached magistrate" rather than by an interested
government official.7 4 The Court's preference for the warrant is so strong
that a search or seizure executed with only a questionable existence of prob-
First, a person must exhibit an "actual (subjective) expectation of privacy." Id. at 361
(Harlan, J., concurring). There can be no expectation of privacy in "what a person knowingly
exposes to the public." Id. at 351 (majority opinion). Second, society must recognize this
expectation as reasonable. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). What society recognizes as
reasonable may differ from person to person--especially in the context of employment, where
the courts must balance the intrinsic nature of the occupation and the conditions of employ-
ment against the individual's expectation of privacy. For a detailed discussion of the expecta-
tion of privacy in relation to drug urinalysis, see Adams, supra note 11, at 1346-52. The
Supreme Court has already determined that drug testing, via blood and urine testing, qualifies
as a fourth amendment search. See also supra note 6 (discussing government involvement as
triggering fourth amendment protection).
69. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968) (government interest justifying search must be
balanced against the intrusion itself).
70. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 561-62 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
71. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21. A variation on this balancing test involves protecting against
any intrusion "up to the point where the community's need for evidence surmounts a specified
standard, ordinarily 'probable cause,' " Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985), and this is
factored into the analysis of the magnitude of intrusion, magnitude being the extent to which
the person's safety and/or health is threatened. Id. at 761. The Winston Court set limitations
on bodily intrusions. Specifically, 'he Winston Court refused to allow a state to compel a
suspect to undergo surgery for the removal of a bullet of evidentiary value. Id. at 766.
Notwithstanding the existence of probable cause, the Court determined that this search was so
intrusive and potentially dangerous to human life as to be unreasonable. Id. at 763-66.
72. FED. R. CalM. P. 4(a)-(c), 41(a)-(c).
73. 2 W.R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.2 (2d ed. 1987).
74. Johnson v. United States. 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); see, e.g., United States v. Lefkowitz,
285 U.S. 452. 464 (1932).
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able cause might, nonetheless, be found reasonable if attended by a
warrant."s
2. The Fourth Amendment's Warrant and Probable Cause
Requirements
The Supreme Court has long respected the safeguards that the fourth
amendment warrant requirement places on searches and seizures.7 6 Because
a disinterested federal magistrate or state judge issues the warrant, 77 the crit-
ical decision of whether there is probable cause to search is made by a person
whose judgment is not swayed by competing law enforcement goals. 8
Though the fourth amendment does not define probable cause, the Supreme
Court has defined the term as "the facts and circumstances within [the of-
ficers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy informa-
tion [being] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution"
to believe a crime occurred. 9 More recently, the Court affirmed a totality of
the circumstances analysis for determining probable cause, examining the
circumstances surrounding the need for the warrant as well as the basis upon
which the knowledge of the circumstances was obtained.8" When a search is
conducted without a search warrant, however, courts must determine
whether the search is otherwise reasonable, and whether exceptions to the
warrant requirement otherwise allow for such a search.
II. JUDICIALLY CRAFTED EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT AND
PROBABLE CAUSE REQUIREMENTS
The United States Supreme Court has recognized a number of types or
methods of searches that do not require a law enforcement officer to obtain a
warrant. The Supreme Court has upheld warrantless searches incident to a
lawful arrest.8 ' The Court has upheld warrantless searches where exigent
75. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965) (citing Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257, 270 (1960)).
76. See id. at 105-06.
77. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c).
78. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14.
79. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925); see also supra note 3 (attempting to
define "probable cause").
80. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
81. Incident to a lawful arrest, both the arrestee's person and the immediate area within
the person's control may be searched for weapons and for any evidence of a crime that could
potentially be concealed or destroyed. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). In
Chimel, pursuant to an arrest procured by warrant, officers searched petitioner's entire home
for stolen coins. At trial, the evidence found was used to convict petitioner of burglary. Id. at
754. The Chimel Court found the search to be unreasonable and expressly limited searches
incident to arrests to the person and immediate area. Chimel overruled two earlier cases which
[Vol. 40:117
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circumstances, such as hot pursuit" or imminent destruction of evidence,
83
do not allow for an opportunity to obtain a warrant. The Court has also
recognized an automobile exception," a plain view exception,"s and an ex-
had allowed for more extensive searches incident to arrests: Harris v. United States, 331 U.S.
145, 151 (1947) (admitted evidence seized in an incidental search of a four-room apartment),
overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
56, 61, 63 (1950) (evidence seized in a one-room business office properly admitted at trial),
overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
82. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (evidence seized when officers entered house
in pursuit of an armed robber held to be admissible). But see Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S.
740, 754 (1984) (limiting the hot pursuit theory, the Supreme Court held unlawful an officer's
warrantless entry into a suspect's home to make an arrest for driving while intoxicated).
83. See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973). The Supreme Court broadened the hot
pursuit exception by creating an exigent circumstance exception. Though not clearly defined
through facts of various cases, factors have evolved to create an exigent circumstances portfo-
lio, one factor being the destructibility of evidence. Id. at 296. In Cupp, police took fingernail
scrapings from the respondent, over his protest and absent a warrant. The seized scrapings
were then used as substantive evidence at trial to convict the respondent of the strangulation
murder of his wife. Id. at 292. The Court found that the respondent had a privacy interest in
the evidence under his fingernails which, therefore, attached a corresponding constitutional
protection subject to the reasonableness requirements of the fourth amendment. Id at 295; see
also I W.R. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 2.6(a), at 459-63. The Court found that seizing the
scrapings did not violate the fourth amendment. Cupp, 412 U.S. at 295-96. The Court based
its opinion on the rationale in Chimel. maintaining that the existence of probable cause, the
ready destructibility of the evidence, and the limited intrusion combined to justify the "police
in subjecting [the suspect] to the very limited search necessary to preserve the highly evanes-
cent evidence they found under his fingernails." Id. at 296; see also Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (the risk of destruction of evidence combined with the existence of
probable cause prompted the Court to uphold the admissibility of a blood test taken at the
request of a police officer by a physician at a hospital). The testing permitted in Schmerber
exceeded the scope of the fingernail scraping in Cupp because the Court allowed an actual
intrusion by a physician into the human body. Id. at 767-68. Previously, an intrusion by
police into the human body to retrieve evidence swallowed in their presence was held unrea-
sonable as "conduct that shocks the conscience." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172
(1952) (police forced a solution through a tube into the defendant's stomach to induce vomit-
ing). Because the Court had not yet decided Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), it was unable
to apply the exclusionary rule to the state. However, the Court found a violation of the four-
teenth amendment due process clause. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 174; 2 W.R. LAFAVE, supra note
73. § 4.1(d), at 127.
Another factor that the court weighs in applying the exigent circumstances exception is the
gravity of the offense. See United States v. Davis, 785 F.2d 610 (8th Cir. 1986) (rape); United
States v. Salvador, 740 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1984) (bank robbery), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1196
(1985). The exigent circumstances exception, however, does have limits, as evidenced by
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), where the Court rejected the Arizona Supreme
Court's attempt to create a "murder-scene" exception to the search warrant requirement. Id.
at 392-95; see also Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17 (1984) (Court applied Mincey to invali-
date the warrantless search of the defendant's house). For a catalogue of pertinent factors used
in determining whether exigent circumstances exist, see Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d
385 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
84. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
85. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
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ception based on consent from the person being searched.s6 The Court, fur-
thermore, has exempted from the warrant requirements the investigative
stop and frisk,87 border searches, 8 inventory searches, 9 and administrative
searches of closely regulated industries.' The administrative search excep-
tion evolved from building inspections and now covers personnel
inspections.
86. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973).
87. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The "stop" and "frisk", is a distinct law enforce-
ment technique with characteristics different from standard practices like arrest and search in
that the stop and frisk involves a brief stop for questioning and a limited search for dangerous
weapons. 3 W.R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.1(a), at 333-34 (2d ed. 1987). In Terry,
an officer observed three men acting in a manner that led him to suspect that a burglary or
possible robbery plan was in progress. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5-7. The officer approached the three
men to question their unusual actions. Id. at 6. Their response caused the officer to grab
petitioner Terry and pat the outside of his clothing in search of weapons. Id. at 7. The Court
held that a frisk was reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment if an officer
possessed reasonable suspicion of ongoing criminal activity and the possibility existed that the
person was "armed and presently dangerous." Id. at 30-31. Under these circumstances, the
officer need not have had probable cause to believe that the person frisked had committed or
was committing a crime; the officer need only have had a reasonable articulable suspicion. Id.
at 27. This was the first step away from a probable cause requirement and toward the lesser
requirement of particularized suspicion. The Terry Court, however, only authorized a frisk for
weapons, and not for evidence. Id. at 25-26, 29.
88. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985). The border search
exception includes brief, routine stops at permanent checkpoints away from the border, United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), even as far away as sixty-six miles, United
States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975). The border search exception allows a brief investigative
stop without a warrant or even reasonable suspicion, but further detention or search requires
probable cause or consent. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). In Montoya
de Hernandez pursuant to the border search exception, customs officials detained a woman
suspected of carrying narcotics in her alimentary canal. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at
534-35. During the more than sixteen hours customs officials detained her, she was taken to a
hospital, given a pregnancy test, and a physician conducted a rectal examination which re-
vealed balloons filled with narcotics. Id. at 535. Montoya de Hernandez illustrates the param-
eters of warrantless bodily intrusions. Id. at 545 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89. Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983).
90. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981);
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397
U.S. 72 (1970); see infra notes 91-164 and accompanying text (for a general discussion of the
administrative search).
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A. The Historical Development of the Administrative Search Exception
1. Residential and Commercial Building Inspections
Judicial scrutiny of warrantless administrative searches developed
predominantly in the context of residential 9' and commercial92 building
codes. 93 Although some codes required the inspector to obtain a search war-
rant when refused admittance, many codes did not require the inspector to
obtain a warrant under any circumstances. 94 The Supreme Court initially
addressed the constitutionality of these warrantless searches in Frank v.
Maryland. 9 In Frank a Baltimore health official, acting on a complaint by
a neighbor, investigated allegations of rat infestation.96 The health official
found evidence of rats around Frank's home, prompting the official to ask
Frank for permission to inspect his basement.97 Frank refused, in violation
of the Baltimore City Code, and was convicted for resisting an inspection.9"
Frank challenged the constitutionality of his conviction.99 The Frank Court
held that the City Code, which required that the inspector get permission
from the occupier or owner to search the premises, yet which imposed a fine
for resisting entry by health officials, did not violate Frank's constitutional
protection against official intrusion."o The Court based its ruling on several
factors. First, the Court reasoned that the building inspector was not seek-
ing evidence for criminal prosecution, thus, Frank was not invoking the fifth
amendment protection against self-incrimination.'03 Next, the Court found
that the Frank inspection was designed solely for the protection of the com-
munity's health.' 0 2 The Court refused to acknowledge a fourth amendment
protection against government intrusion when the intrusion was to maintain
minimum community standards of health. Finally, the Court determined
91. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 525-26 & n.1 (1967) (San Francisco
Housing Code provided for annual inspection).
92. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. at 311-12 (Gun Control Act of 1968 authorized
officials to enter pawn shop to inspect records and firearms).
93. See 3 W. R. LAFAVE, supra note 87, § 10.1, at 597-98 (housing codes set minimum
standards for habitability by requiring proper maintenance of such things as lighting, ventila-
tion, sinks and toilets, heating, and elimination of rodents); see also Note, Municipal Housing
Codes. 69 HARv. L. REv. 1115, 1116-17 (1956) (discussing the function of housing codes).
The success of enforcement depends on the effectiveness of the inspection system. Id. at 1124.
94. See Note, supra note 93, at 1125.
95. 359 U.S. 360 (1959) overruled by Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
96. Id. at 361.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 361-62.
99. Id. at 362.
100. Id. at 361, 366-67.
101. Id. at 366.
102. Id.
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that the inspection was executed in a reasonable manner.10 3 The municipal
code strictly limited the manner of inspection, requiring inspections to be
conducted during convenient hours of the day, and prohibiting investigators
from making forcible entries."04 The Court placed great weight on the regu-
lation's requirement that valid grounds for suspicion of code violations exist
before entry may be requested.' The Court left unanswered whether or
not "valid grounds for suspicion" equated to probable cause.
In Camara v. Municipal Court,'06 the Supreme Court clarified that prob-
able cause is not the sine qua non for an administrative search.' 0 7 In
Camara, a housing inspector entered an apartment building to make a rou-
tine annual inspection, pursuant to the San Francisco Housing Code.' The
building's manager informed the housing inspector that Camara, a resident,
occupied a portion of the ground floor in violation of the building's occu-
pancy permit."°9 Similar to the facts in Frank, the housing inspector, with-
out a warrant, demanded entry to inspect Camara's residence, and Camara
refused." 0 The Division of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco De-
partment of Public Health filed a complaint against Camara charging him
with violating the Housing Code by refusing the inspector's entry."' At
trial, Camara argued that the Housing Code violated the fourth amendment
by authorizing the inspector's warrantless search." 2 The Court employed a
balancing test to assess the validity of the administrative search, ultimately
finding that the inspector's reasonable belief that a code violation existed
justified his limited intrusion. "' The Court, however, overruled its earlier
decision in Frank, "4 holding that in the absence of an emergency," 5 when
103. Id. at 366-67.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 366. The Court found that a half-ton pile of filth constituted reasonable
grounds for suspicion. Id. at 361, 366.
106. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
107. Id. at 539.
108. Id. at 525-26.
109. Id. at 526.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 526-27.
112. Id. at 527 & n.2.
113. Id. at 533. The Court used a balancing test similar to the one propounded in Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). For discussion of the Terry balancing test, see supra notes 68-71 and
accompanying text.
114. Camara, 387 U.S. at 528.
115. For discussion of some recognized emergency situations allowing for warrantless
search, see supra notes 82-83.
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the owner or occupant refused to consent 16 to the inspector's entry, the
fourth amendment required the inspector to obtain a search warrant." 7
Historically, commercial as well as residential buildings have been subject
to administrative inspections to ensure compliance with fire, health and
safety regulations.1 8 In 1972, the Court appeared to settle the constitution-
ality of administrative searches in business settings by upholding the inspec-
tion of a licensed gun dealer's storeroom in United States v. Biswell. , " In
Biswell, a Federal Treasury agent visited the dealer's pawn shop to inspect
records and the firearms storeroom, as authorized by federal law.120 As in
previous administrative inspections, the agent did not have a warrant.' 2 '
The agent, however, told the dealer that federal law authorized the inspec-
tion.' 22 As a result, the dealer allowed the agent's entry into a locked gun
storeroom. 23 The agent discovered guns that the dealer was not licensed to
possess. Subsequently, the government used the guns as evidence to indict
and convict Biswell.1
24
While the Court found that federal regulation of firearms was not as
deeply rooted as the regulation of other industries, the Court acknowledged
that federal firearm regulation was of central importance in effecting certain
governmental interests. 25  Specifically, the Court found that the federal
agent's intrusion constituted a minimal threat to the dealer's expectation of
116. The Court has not been offered the opportunity to determine whether consent to an
administrative search shall be judged under the same strict factors as consent to a criminal
search. See 3 W.R. LAFAVE, supra note 87, § 10.1(f), at 621.
117. Camara, 387 U.S. at 540.
118. See supra note 93; see, e.g., Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act authorized inspection of employee's work area wih a warrant);
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (warrant needed to search a commerical building for
a fire inspection program).
119. 406 U.S. 311 (1972). Note that in previous cases dealing with warrantless administra-
tive inspections on business premises, the Supreme Court skirted the fourth amendment issue
by basing its decisions on other grounds. See Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397
U.S. 72 (1970) (search based on forcible entry into liquor storeroom exceeding congressionally
authorized statutory inspection found invalid); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946)
(search of gasoline station for ration coupons based on consent where law required ration
coupons be available for inspection at business premises held valid).
120. Biswell, 406 U.S. at 311-12; see Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, §§ 921-
928, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1988)). The Gun Control
Act of 1968 authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate to enter the premises or
storage areas of firearms dealers during business hours to inspect the dealers' records or the
firearms themselves. Id. §§ 921(a)(18), 923(g), 82 Stat. 1216, 1223 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(18), 923(g) (1988)).
121. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
122. Biswell, 406 U.S. at 312.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 312-13.
125. Id. at 315.
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privacy because the firearms industry is heavily regulated. 126 The Court
stated that by "choos[ing] to engage in this pervasively regulated business,"
the dealer knowingly subjected his premises to inspection.' 27 Moreover, the
Court found compelling governmental interests in preventing violent crimes
and in controlling the sale of firearms; these interests outweighed the limited
intrusion on the firearm dealer's privacy.'22 The Biswell Court concluded
that requiring compliance with the warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment would vitiate the effectiveness of the inspection program by re-
stricting the flexibility of frequent, unannounced inspections.' 29 Therefore,
the Court upheld the warrantless inspection as specifically authorized by
statute. '
3 0
The Court revisited the constitutionality of warrantless administrative in-
spections in the context of Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act)
regulations.13 ' In Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 132 the OSH Act provision at
issue allowed the Secretary of Labor broad discretion to search, at any rea-
sonable time, any place in any factory, plant, construction site, or work envi-
ronment. 133 The Court determined that such a provision violated the spirit
of the fourth amendment.134 The Court distinguished Barlow's from Colon-
nade and Biswell, "' finding that the effectiveness of the inspection program
would not be vitiated by requiring OSHA inspectors to obtain warrants prior
to administrative searches.
Just as the Barlow's Court distinguished Colonnade and Biswell, 136 the
Court in Donovan v. Dewey' 37 refined the Barlow's holding.' 38 In Dewey, the
Supreme Court upheld a warrantless administrative inspection authorized by
the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (Mine Safety Act).' 39 As in
126. Id. at 316.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 317.
129. Id. at 316-17.
130. Id. at 317.
131. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 8(a), 84 Stat.
1590, 1598 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1988)).
132. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
133. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 § 8(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 657(a)).
134. Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 323-25.
135. Id. at 313. But see 3 W.R. LAFAVE, supra note 87, § 10.2(c), at 639-41 (explaining
how the Court erroneously developed its distinguishing analysis of Colonnade and Biswell).
136. Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 313.
137. 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
138. Id. at 603.
139. Id. at 606; see Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-164,
§ 103, 91 Stat. 1290, 1297 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 813 (1988)). The Mine Safety
Act provides for a minimum of four inspections per year for underground mines, and a mini-
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Biswell, the Court determined that the fourth amendment warrant require-
ment frustrated the effectiveness of the Mine Safety Act."o The Court justi-
fied its decision in Dewey by distinguishing the statute in Barlow's, which
allowed total discretion as to the parameters of the search. 4 ' The statute in
Dewey, by contrast, provided for a rigid, narrow statutory inspection
scheme. '42
In New York v. Burger, 4 3 the Court continued abrogating the fourth
amendment warrant-probable cause requirement in the administrative con-
text. In Burger, the Court upheld a warrantless inspection of the defend-
ant's junkyard by five Auto Crimes Division officers, effected pursuant to a
New York statute. 45 The Court held that, in light of junkyard regulation
and the history of regulation of related industries, the statute authorizing
warrantless administrative inspections was valid.' 6 Moreover, the Court
held that states could use administrative programs in conjunction with their
criminal statutes to deal with major social problems, such as automobile
theft, 147 and that these administrative searches were not unconstitutional
simply because administrative agents found evidence of crime during the
search. 48
2. Personnel Inspections: Drug Testing of Employees
The administrative search exception, which arose from building inspec-
tions, now encompasses employee drug testing. The military was the fore-
runner in personnel drug testing programs,' 49 and the United States Court
of Military Appeals reaffirmed the constitutionality of the testing in Unger v.
Ziemniak. "' After weighing the intrusion to the individual of the proce-
dure against the government's compelling need to maintain a ready military
mum of two inspections per year for surface mines. Id. § 103(a) (codified as amended at 30
U.S.C. § 813(a)). Further, the Act allows inspections without advance notice. Id. If the mine
operator refuses to allow a warrantless inspection, civil action may be instituted against the
operator. Id. § 108(a)(1)(C) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 818(a)(1)(C)).
140. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 602-03.
141. Id. at 603.
142. Id.
143. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 693-94, 708-12.
146. Id. at 706-07, 712.
147. Id. at 708-10.
148. Id. at 716-17.
149. Drug testing of employees is also a common occurrence within the sports industry.
See Wong & Ensor, Major League Baseball and Drugs: Fight the Problem or the Player?, I I
NOVA L. J. 779 (1987); see also O'Halloran v. NCAA, 856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1988) (student
athlete sought to enjoin state university's drug testing program).
150. 27 M.J. 349 (C.M.A. 1989).
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force, the court held that compulsory urinalysis was reasonable within the
meaning of the fourth amendment.' 5 ' The court had previously acknowl-
edged that the drug abuse problem in the military seriously affected not only
the "health, morale and fitness for duty of persons in the [a]rmed
[f]orces," 5 2 but also placed the United States at a serious military and geo-
political disadvantage.' 53 The military court cautioned, however, that
although compulsory urinalysis may be constitutional, the manner in which
it is performed could still violate the fourth amendment's reasonableness
requirement. 
5 4
With few exceptions, the state and federal courts require reasonable suspi-
cion to validate the blood and urinalysis testing of both public and private
sector employees.' 55 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit created an exception, however, in Shoemaker v. Handel. 56 Shoemaker
involved New Jersey Racing Commission regulations permitting drug testing
of jockeys, trainers, grooms and track officials.' In Shoemaker, the Third
Circuit applied the administrative search exception and upheld random
urinalysis even where the State Racing Steward had no reasonable suspicion
of employees' drug or alcohol use.'58 The basis of the court's decision was
that, because the horse racing industry is heavily regulated, the employees in
the industry are subject to, and expect, a reduced privacy interest.' 59 The
court recognized that when jockeys become involved in horse racing, they
implicitly consent to the drug testing based on their knowledge that state
151. Id. at 357. The military court further stated, however, that "the military community
is not necessarily subject to the same limitations that would be applicable in the civilian soci-
ety." Id. at 357 n.17.
152. United States v. Trottier, 9 M.J. 337, 346 (C.M.A. 1980) (quoting United States v.
Williams, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 325, 327, 24 C.M.R. 135, 137 (1957)).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 358; see also United States v. Middleton, 10 M.J. 123, 127 (C.M.A. 1981)
(unique condition of the military may not apply to the fourth amendment safeguards). For
other examples of compulsory urinalysis found reasonable within fourth amendment require-
ments, see Committee for G. I. Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (upholding
compulsory urinalysis of Army personnel in Europe); Murray v. Haldeman, 16 M.J. 74
(C.M.A. 1983) (upholding compulsory urinalysis of all military personnel attending an appren-
tice school at the Naval Damage Control Training Center).
155. See, e.g., Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1277 v. Sunline Transit Agency, 663 F.
Supp. 1560 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (reasonable suspicion required to test bus drivers); Feliciano v.
City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (individualized suspicion required to
test police officers); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986) (same for
firemen and policemen).
156. 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986).
157. Id. at 1137.
158. Id. at 1142.
159. Id. at 1138, 1144.
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licensing requires such testing."so In addition, the Third Circuit found that
the state had a strong interest in maintaining the integrity of the horse racing
industry.' 6 ' Thus, the court determined that the balancing test required by
the fourth amendment favored the government's warrantless administrative
search.
In another context, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit endorsed random drug testing without requiring a showing of rea-
sonable suspicion. In Rushton v. Nebraska Public Power District, 162 the
court upheld drug testing of private employees who had access to protected
areas in a nuclear power plant. 163 The court determined that between the
employees' reduced expectation of privacy by virtue of employment in the
heavily regulated nuclear power industry, and the significant public safety
concerns present, a search did not call for a reasonable suspicion
requirement.'"
The administrative search exception, having been found to encompass a
broad array of building, work premises, and personal body searches, still did
not adequately cover searches of more recent controversy, namely, searches
for "special needs." These special needs included such things as searching
students for items detrimental to an appropriate learning environment, and
searching hospital offices to maintain supervision over medical doctors. In
response, the Supreme Court created a further exception to the warrant and
probable cause requirements.
B. The Special Needs Exception
An additional exception to fourth amendment warrant and probable cause
requirements is the special needs exception. This exception developed in
160. Id. at 1142.
161. Id.
162. 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988).
163. Id. at 562.
164. Id. at 566-67. Additionally, the court reasoned that testing was used to determine
fitness, not to find evidence for criminal prosecution. Id. In another Eighth Circuit case, the
court held that state corrections officers could demonstrate the same need, therefore justifying
the use of uniform or systematic random searches without the predicate of reasonable suspi-
cion. McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987). The Fifth Circuit also upheld the
constitutionality of uniform drug testing without a showing of reasonable suspicion in Na-
tional Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), affid in part, 489
U.S. 656 (1989) (The Supreme Court affirmed the portion of the Fifth Circuit's decision which
upheld drug testing of employees in positions requiring direct contact with illegal drugs or
positions requiring the carrying of firearms, but it vacated the portion of the Fifth Circuit's
decision which upheld drug testing employees in positions handling "classified" material.).
The Fifth Circuit deemed such searches reasonable because the intrusion was minimal. Id. at
177. Also relevant to the court's analysis was the fact that employees could choose not to seek
transfers to sensitive jobs and thereby avoid any drug testing scheme altogether. Id at 178.
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New Jersey v. TL.O., 165 as the result of a school official's search of a stu-
dent's purse. 166 In T.L.O., a high school teacher discovered a student smok-
ing cigarettes in a school lavatory, in violation of a school regulation.
67
When questioned by the assistant vice principal, the student denied the inci-
dent. 168 The assistant vice principal searched the student's purse, finding
cigarettes as well as paraphernalia commonly associated with marijuana.'
69
Upon finding this evidence, the assistant vice principal searched the purse
more thoroughly and found evidence implicating the student in marijuana
dealing.'7 ' The student challenged the search as violative of the fourth
amendment."' The United States Supreme Court, however, held the search
to be reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment.' 7 2
The Court based its reasonableness determination on the circumstances
surrounding the search.' 73 The Court assessed both the reasonableness of
the search at its inception, and the reasonableness of the intrusion in relation
to the purpose that initially justified the search. 174 The Court stated that
ordinarily, a search would be justified at its inception when the school official
possesses reasonable grounds to believe that the search will uncover evidence
of a student's violation of either the law or school regulations. 175 In striking
a balance between the student's expectation of privacy and the school's need
to maintain an appropriate learning environment, the Court determined that
the school's need must prevail.' 76 Therefore, the Court concluded that
school officials needed neither a warrant nor probable cause to effect such a
search. 1
77
Justice Blackmun's concurrence in T.L. 0 attempted to clarify the specific
circumstances which allowed dispensing with the warrant and probable
165. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
166. Id.




171. Id. at 329.
172. Id. at 347-48.
173. Id. at 345-47. The Court relied on Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37
(1967), to determine the standard by which to test the reasonableness of the search. TL.O.,
469 U.S. at 337. The Court created this standard by balancing the need for the search against
the intrusion. Id.
174. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
175. Id. at 342.
176. Id. at 340.
177. Id. The Court cited to Camara, 387 U.S. at 532-33, in determining that the additional
burden upon school officials to obtain a warrant prior to searching the student would frustrate
the school's purpose behind the search. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340.
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cause requirements. "78 Justice Blackmun stated that "[o]nly in those excep-
tional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impractica-
ble, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the
Framers."
79
Several years after TL. 0., the Supreme Court again considered the special
needs exception in O'Connor v. Ortega. 180 In O'Connor, state hospital offi-
cials accused a doctor managing the psychiatric residency program of possi-
ble improprieties."'' Hospital officials placed the doctor on administrative
leave pending their investigation. 8 2 Incident to the officials' investigation,
hospital personnel searched the doctor's office, desk, and file cabinets, seizing
both personal and official property.' 8 3 Following completion of the investi-
gation, hospital officials dismissed the doctor. 184 Thereafter, the doctor filed
an action against the hospital officials, alleging that the search violated his
fourth amendment rights.' 8 '
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the
lower court's finding of a lawful search on the grounds that the search vio-
lated the fourth amendment. 8 6 The Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded, emphasizing that the issue of whether public employees have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their workplace must be addressed
under the specific circumstances of each case.'8 7 The Court acknowledged
that while, generally, a warrantless search is per se unreasonable, circum-
stances exist that do not require officials to obtain a warrant prior to a
search.' The Court, relying on Camara v. Municipal Court, found that
"[i]mposing unwieldy warrant procedures" on the doctor's supervisors in
O'Connor "would be unduly burdensome," and would frustrate the original
reasons for the search.'8 9 Additionally, the Court relied on Justice Black-
mun's concurring opinion in TL.O., which illustrated the special needs ex-
178. T.L.O.. 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
179. Id.
180. 480 U.S. 709 (1987). For a discussion of this case, see Note, Governmental Intrusion
Into the Public Employee Workplace-O'Connor v. Ortega, 21 CREIGHTON L. REV. 409
(1987).
181. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 712.
182. Id. at 712-13.
183. Id. at 713.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 714.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 715-16.
188. Id. at 720 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967)).
189. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 722.
1990]
Catholic University Law Review
ception to the warrant requirement, to determine that the facts in O'Connor
supported application of the same exception. Specifically, the Court stated
that there are "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
[that] make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable."'
Having determined that the search required neither a warrant nor probable
cause, the Court remanded to the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California to determine the reasonableness of the
search.19' Further, the Court instructed the district court to judge the rea-
sonableness of the search's inception and scope by looking at the totality of
circumstances. '
92
Only three months after O'Connor, the Supreme Court had an opportu-
nity to create yet another special needs exception. In Griffin v. Wisconsin,' 93
the issue concerned a state probation department regulation allowing proba-
tion officers to search a parolee's home without a warrant or probable cause,
provided the officer had supervisory approval and reasonable grounds to be-
lieve the home contained contraband.' 94 The probation officer in Griffin re-
ceived information from a police detective indicating that the parolee
possessed firearms in his apartment in violation of probation regulations. 195
The probation officer searched the parolee's apartment and seized a gun,
which was used as evidence to convict the parolee of felony possession of
firearms. '
96
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's decision upholding the reasonableness of the search. The Court
190. Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring)). Ironically, Justice Blackmun, who penned the special needs exception in T.L.O., dis-
sented from the opinion and judgment in O'Connor. 480 U.S. at 732 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). In summary, Justice Blackmun found that in the O'Connor case, there was no
special need, and therefore, the investigatory search should have been evaluated under the
traditional standard set by the warrant and probable cause requirements of the fourth amend-
ment. Id. at 732-33.
191. Id. at 729.
192. Id. The Court relied on the Terry two part test to establish this standard of reasona-
bleness. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
193. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
194. Id. at 870-71. Cf Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 317-18 (1971) (the Court found
that a warrantless visit by a caseworker to a welfare benefactor's home did not constitute a
search within the meaning of the fourth amendment). In Wyman, even assuming that there
had been a search, the Court would have found it reasonable. Id. at 318-24. The Court rea-
soned that the visit was permissible because it was made by a caseworker for purposes other
than criminal investigation. Id. at 323. Compare Wyman, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) with Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (Goldberg. decided just prior to Wyman. held that the
government could not require a recipient of government benefits to waive his constitutional
rights). See also 3 W.R. LAFAVE, supra note 87, § 10.3(a), at 670-71 (discussing Wyman).
195. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 871.
196. Id. at 871-72.
[Vol. 40:117
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association
based its decision on the special needs of the probation system.197 The Court
stated that in supervising parolees, probation officers should not be burdened
by warrant constraints when protecting the community from parolees who
are in violation of their rehabilitation programs.' 98 Further, the Court ac-
knowledged that the special needs of the probation system justified dispens-
ing with the probable cause requirement. The Court's finding first centered
on the fact that the probation regulation contained factors to consider in
determining whether the officer had reasonable grounds to believe a proba-
tion violation occurred. Second, the Court found that the regulation pro-
vided a sufficient substitute for a neutral magistrate's determination of
probable cause. 99
The Court's next opportunity to revisit the special needs exception oc-
cured in the context of a mandatory employee drug testing program. The
Court addressed the constitutionality of railroad regulations mandating
post-accident drug tests of employees in Skinner v. Railway Labor Execu-
tives' Association.20°
III. SKINNER V. RAILWAY LABOR EXECUTIVES' ASSOCIATION: THE
SUPREME COURT REVISITS THE SPECIAL NEEDS EXCEPTION
In 1970, Congress enacted the Federal Railroad Safety Act,2° which em-
powered the Secretary of Transportation to regulate "all areas of railroad
197. Id. at 873-74. The Court compared the operation of the probation system to the oper-
ation of a school, government office or prison, and supervision of a regulated industry, in
finding special needs beyond normal law enforcement. Id. at 873. Despite this comparison,
the special needs cases thus far decided involve only the special needs in operating schools,
government offices, and now prisons (probation systems). See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S.
709, 720 (1987); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
198. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874-75.
199. Id. at 878-79.
200. 489 U.S. 602 (1989). The same day, the Supreme Court decided the companion case
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), which involved the
implementation of a drug testing program for customs employees to be placed in positions
requiring direct involvement in drug interdiction, the carrying of firearms, or the handling of
classified material. Id. at 660-61. The Court affirmed the portion of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's decision upholding drug testing employees in positions of direct
drug interdiction or positions requiring the carrying of firearms. Id. at 664-65.
201. Beginning as early as 1907, the government has regulated the railroad industry based
on safety concerns. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 593 (9th Cir.
1988) (Alarcon, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,
489 U.S. 602 (1989). Congress, in the Hours of Service Act of 1907, initially limited the
number of hours railroad personnel could work within a twenty-four hour period. Hours of
Service Act of 1907, ch. 2939, § 2, 34 Stat. 1415, 1416 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. § 62
(a) (1988)). Soon afterward, Congress passed the Accident Reports Act of 1910, requiring
railroads to provide monthly accident reports to the Secretary of Transportation. Accident
Reports Act of 1910, ch. 208, §§ 1-5, 36 Stat. 350, 350-51 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C.
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safety"2 °2 through investigations, inspections, and the testing of railroad
equipment, operations, and personnel.2 °3 Subsequently, the Secretary of
Transportation delegated this authority to the Administrator of the Federal
Railroad Administration (FRA).2° Through this delegation of power, the
FRA promulgated numerous safety regulations for the railroad industry.20 5
Most recently, the FRA promulgated regulations providing for mandatory
post-accident drug testing and testing upon reasonable suspicion of drug
abuse or violation of certain railroad operating rules.2° These regulations
provide for drug testing of railroad employees through blood and urinalysis
tests.2 °7
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'Association, 208 the Railway Labor
Executives' Association (RLEA)2 9 filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California to enjoin the implementation
of the FRA's employee drug testing regulations. 2 '0 The RLEA challenged
the regulations on various statutory and constitutional grounds. 21" The dis-
trict court found merit only in the RLEA's fourth amendment challenge,
however, and granted summary judgment for the Secretary of
Transportation.21 2
The RLEA appealed the district court's decision to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where a divided panel reversed the
§§ 38-42 (1988)). The Act specifically prohibits the use of any report, whether supplied by the
railroad or supplied by the secretary subsequent to an investigation, as evidence in any suit or
action for damages. Id. § 4, 36 Stat. 350, 351 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. § 41 (1988)).
202. Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-458, § 202, 84 Stat. 971, 971
(codified at 45 U.S.C. § 431(a) (1988)).
203. Id. § 208 (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 437(a)).
204. 49 C.F.R. § 1.49 (1989).
205. See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. §§ 218.1-218.30 (1989) (prescribing safety procedures when co-
workers are on rail tracks); id. § 218.37 (prescribing safety procedures when trains run at
reduced speed); id. § 220.61 (prescribing safety procedures for transmitting or receiving or-
ders); see also Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 593 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Alarcon, J., dissenting) (discussing railroad regulations), rev'd sub nom. Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
206. 49 C.F.R. § 219; see supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
207. 49 C.F.R. § 219.
208. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
209. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
210. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 612.
211. The RLEA initially challenged the employee drug testing regulations as constitutional
violations of the fourth amendment, the fundamental right to privacy, and due process by
arbitrary discrimination. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 579. 592
(9th Cir. 1988), rev'd sub noma. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602
(1989). The RLEA also challenged the regulations as violating provisions of the Railway La-
bor Act, the Federal Rehabilitation Act, and the Federal Railroad Safety Act. Id. at 590-91.
212. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 612.
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lower court.2 t3 The Ninth Circuit declared that the regulations violated the
fourth amendment on two grounds. First, the court asserted that a particu-
larized suspicion of drug or alcohol impairment is essential for post-accident
toxicological testing to be justified at its inception.214 Second, the Ninth
Circuit found that use of blood and urine tests to establish drug use was not
reasonably related to the government's purpose for the tests because the tests
could not measure current employee drug or alcohol impairment. 215 The
government appealed, 21 6 and the United States Supreme Court granted
217certiorari.
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, determining that warrant-
less drug testing of railroad employees without probable cause or particular-
ized suspicion was reasonable within the meaning of the fourth
amendment.2 1 The Court examined the history of search and seizure juris-
prudence, mapped out the warrant and probable cause exceptions, 21 9 and
then extracted pieces from each area of search and seizure law to create yet
another "special needs" exception to the fourth amendment search warrant-
probable cause requirement.
220
A. The Majority: Expanding the Special Needs Exception to Persons
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, first reviewed the constitution-
ality of the FRA's drug testing regulations by considering whether the FRA
regulations amounted to governmental action sufficient to trigger fourth
amendment protections. 22' The Court determined that the government's
participation in the creation of these regulations was sufficient to raise fourth
amendment concerns.
222
The Court then looked to whether the blood and urinalysis testing consti-
tuted a fourth amendment search. 223 The majority acknowledged the una-
nimity among the United States Courts of Appeals that urine tests
"intrude[] upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as
213. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 575.
214. Id. at 587.
215. Id. at 588.
216. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 613.
217. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 486 U.S. 1042 (1988).
218. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634.
219. Id. at 619-25.
220. Id. at 620.
221. Id. at 614.
222. Id. at 615-16. The Court noted that the government regulations removed all legal
barriers to the railroads testing their employees under subpart D. Additionally, the govern-
ment both encouraged testing and prohibited railroads from bargaining away subpart D test-
ing. Id. at 615. For an explanation of subpart D, see supra note 19.
223. Skinner. 489 U.S. at 616; see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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reasonable. ' 224 Therefore, the Supreme Court declared that the testing re-
quired by the FRA regulations constituted a search within the meaning of
the fourth amendment.225 Moreover, relying on its own precedent, the
Court reaffirmed its characterization of blood and breath tests as fourth
amendment searches.226
Next, the majority reviewed the fourth amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches.227 The Court recognized that, because the fourth
amendment forbids only unreasonable searches, an examination of the rea-
sonableness of FRA prescribed searches was required.228 The Court estab-
lished that normally, the reasonableness test necessitates a balancing
between an individual's privacy interest and the government's interest in the
search.229 Justice Kennedy observed that in criminal cases this balancing
typically requires that a warrant, based upon probable cause, be issued prior
to a search.23° In Skinner, however, the Court determined that, although
the government's search lacked both the warrant and probable cause re-
quirements, the search was still reasonable.23 1
In making its reasonableness determination, the Court applied the newest
exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements: the special needs
232exception. 2 The Court noted that it previously had recognized that in
some cases " 'special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.' "233 In
224. Skinner. 489 U.S. at 617.
225. Id.: see, e.g., Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539, 1542 (6th Cir. 1988);
Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dept., 840 F.2d 1139, 1143 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1004 (1989); Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1511 (11 th Cir. 1987); National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 176 (5th Cir. 1987), affd in part, 489 U.S. 656
(1989); McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1307 (8th Cir. 1987); Division 241 Amalgamated
Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264. 1266-67 (7th Cir.), cert. denied. 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
226. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616-17; see California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).




231. Id. at 634. While Justice Scalia joined Justice Kennedy's opinion in Skinner, he dis-
sented from Justice Kennedy's opinion in the companion case, National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), finding that the customs employees drug testing
program was an unreasonable search. Id. at 680-87 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia con-
sidered the Skinner search to be a less intrusive bodily search. Id. at 680. Further, he found
the drug testing program reasonable based upon a demonstrated drug problem among covered
railroad employees and upon a demonstrated connection between the drug problem and harm
to society. Id.
232. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620-21; see supra notes 165-200 and accompanying text.
233. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., concurring)); see Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (effective probation
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applying the special needs exception to the facts in Skinner, the Court found
that many railroad employees are engaged in safety sensitive tasks.234 If
these tasks were performed by chemically impaired employees, then the re-
sults would directly affect the employees themselves and the traveling pub-
lic.2 35 Therefore, the majority extended the special needs exception to
include the need for a safe railroad transportation program.236
In addition, the majority relied on its decision in Camara v. Municipal
Court237 to assert that a warrant is dispensable where it frustrates the pur-
pose behind the search. 238 The Court determined that, where blood, urine,
and breath tests must be taken as soon as possible to preserve evidence in the
bloodstream, warrant requirements significantly hinder governmental test-
ing. 239 The majority concluded that the certainty and regularity of testing
prescribed by the FRA regulations ensured adequate fourth amendment
safeguards without the requirement of a warrant.2"
After dispensing with the warrant requirements, the Court examined the
FRA's regulations requiring that searches be based on reasonable suspicion
rather than on the more stringent probable cause standard.2 4' While the
majority acknowledged that in some situations the balancing of interests pre-
cludes application of the probable cause requirement, the Court noted that
some reasonable suspicion requirement still exists in order for the search to
system); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (efficient workplace); T.LO., 469 U.S. at
341 (orderly maintained school system).
234. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 621. Justice Kennedy cited two additional cases in supporting his special needs
exception: New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), and Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
These two cases, however, do not conform to the special needs criteria. Burger, involving an
inspection of a junkyard, was decided based on the theory of a highly regulated industry and
falls within the administrative inspection search category. Burger, 482 U.S. at 689-703. Wolf-
ish, concerning a body cavity search of prison inmates, contemplated whether the visual body-
cavity inspection could "ever be conducted on less than probable cause." Wolfish, 441 U.S. at
560. The Wolfish Court balanced the prison's security interests against the inmates' privacy
interests and concluded the inspection could be conducted. Id. Additionally, the Court found
that, although prison inmates do not relinquish their constitutional rights at the prison gates,
nonetheless, these rights may acquire certain restrictions and limitations required by the penal
system. Id. at 545-46.
237. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
238. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 623; Camara, 387 U.S. at 533.
239. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 623.
240. Id. at 624. But compare this rationale with Justice Kennedy's subsequent comments
on the deterrent nature of the drug testing. Justice Kennedy found the drug testing a signifi-
cant deterrent to drug and alcohol use partly due to the unpredictability of events triggering
the drug testing. Id. at 630; see also infra notes 281-82 and accompanying text.
241. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624. A portion of subpart D of the FRA regulations requires
reasonable suspicion; subpart C requires neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion. See
supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
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be reasonable.242 After stating this maxim, however, the Court required a
quantum of evidence less than reasonable suspicion.243 The majority as-
serted that, where the privacy interest threatened by the search is minimal
and the government's interest in the search compelling, the search, absent
even reasonable suspicion, is legally permissible. 2"
Weighing the privacy interest against the government's interest in Skin-
ner, the Court opined that several factors minimized the railroad employees'
privacy interest. First, Justice Kennedy noted that the individual railroad
employee's expectation of privacy was diminished because the employee
chose to work in a highly regulated industry.245 Second, the Court asserted
that the challenged regulation, in part, assured the health and fitness of the
employees.246 Not only did the government have a great interest in public
safety, the Court reasoned, but public safety also was intimately dependent
on the health and fitness of the employees.
247
Justice Kennedy analogized the FRA regulations' drug testing procedures
to a fire scene investigation.248 Justice Kennedy noted that the "prompt in-
vestigation [for] the cause. of a fire may uncover continuing dangers and
thereby prevent the fire's recurrence."2 49 Likewise, the Court asserted, the
FRA drug testing procedures provide one means of investigating the cause
of major railroad accidents and may uncover continuing dangers resulting
from drug-impaired employees, thereby preventing additional railroad acci-
dents.25° In addition, the Court reasoned by extrapolation that test results
indicating a lack of employee drug or alcohol impairment would help the
242. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624.
243. Id.
244. Id. Justice Kennedy cited to United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61
(1976), when stating that the fourth amendment imposes no minimal requirement of reason-
able suspicion. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624. The Martinez-Fuerte Court, however, limited its
holding to the specific facts of the case: a brief questioning of a vehicle occupant at a perma-
nent border checkpoint, no personal contact, and the checkpoint was operating under a magis-
trate's warrant of inspection. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 546-47, 567. Additionally, the
Martinez-Fuerte Court found that " 'any further detention ... must be based on consent or
probable cause.' " Id. at 567 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882
(1975)).
245. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 627-28. Agency research indicates that impaired employees can seriously
threaten public safety long before supervisors, or even physicians, observe any signs of physical
impairment. Thus, drug testing without particularized suspicion is crucial for effecting such a
safety program. Id.; see 50 Fed. Reg. 31,526 (1985).
248. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 630.
249. Id. (citing Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 510 (1978)).
250. Id.
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industry establish the probability of equipment failure or other potential
causes for accidents. 5'
Finally, the Court recognized that, while FRA regulations detect em-
ployee drug and alcohol impairment, the regulations also help to deter drug
and alcohol use. 252 The majority found that the dismissal sanction for using
drugs or alcohol on duty, coupled with the unpredictable timing for em-
ployee testing, greatly deterred on-the-job impairment.253 In summary, the
Court determined that "[t]he Government may take all necessary and rea-
sonable regulatory steps to prevent or deter" impaired performance of sensi-
tive tasks that threaten public safety.254 In particular, the Court endorsed
steps that included submitting employees to body fluid searches in order to
protect the government's interest in reducing drug use by railroad
personnel. 55
B. The Dissent: Rejecting the "Patchwork" 256 Special Needs Exception
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, rejected the majority's recog-
nition of a special needs exception to the warrant and probable cause re-
quirements for the drug testing of railroad employees.257 Justice Marshall
envisioned the majority's special needs exception as potentially permeating
every protected area under the fourth amendment.25s Justice Marshall
251. Id.
252. Id. at 632.
253. Id. at 629-30. Justice Stevens, however, rejected the deterrence rationale. Id. at 634
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). In his concurring opinion, Jus-
tice Stevens noted that few railroad employees go to work with the expectation that a cata-
strophic accident might occur. Thus, he reasoned, few employees would expect to be involved
in an event triggering the drug and alcohol testing. Id. Additionally, the consequence of de-
tection is loss of employment; the consequence of using drugs can be serious bodily harm or
even death. Id.: see also 53 Fed. Reg. 47,129 (1988) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. § 219.605)
(suspension of employees who test positive). The risk of losing employment, therefore, would
seem unlikely to deter one who has already chosen the risk of serious bodily harm. Skinner,
489 U.S. at 634.
254. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633 (majority opinion).
255. Id.
256. "In the four years since this Court . . . first began recognizing 'special needs'
exceptions to the [flourth [a]mendment, the clarity of [flourth [a]mendment doctrine has been
badly distorted, as the Court has eclipsed the probable-cause requirement in a patchwork quilt
of settings ...." Id. at 639 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 635-55.
258. Id. at 635-36. Justice Marshall pointed to special needs allowing a search of a home,
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 871-72 (1987) (police officer had reasonable grounds to
search probationer's home), a search of papers, O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987)
(hospital officials had individualized suspicion to search physician's office), a search of effects,
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 328, 342 n.8 (1985) (school authorities had individualized
suspicion to search student's purse), and now a search of the person with Skinner. Skinner,
489 U.S. at 636-37.
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viewed prior Supreme Court case law as supporting the requirement that a
search, whether conducted pursuant to a warrant or one of the exceptions,
requires a showing of probable cause except when the intrusion is so minimal
that there is no full-scale search. 259 The dissent stated, however, that even
where an exception to a finding of probable cause exists, a showing of indi-
vidualized suspicion remains. 2 ' Thus, the dissent asserted that only the
most brief and routine encounters alleviated the need for a showing of at
least reasonable suspicion.26 '
Justice Marshall did not categorize intrusions into the human body for
drug testing as brief and routine encounters.262 Justice Marshall opined that
categorization of a search as justified by a special need allows the Court
almost unlimited discretion to lower the reasonableness requirements of any
civil search.263 Justice Marshall criticized the extreme flexibility of the spe-
cial needs balancing approach. 26' Here, Justice Marshall asserted that this
flexibility allowed government searches for drugs and alcohol to be based
solely upon an interest in public safety. 265 The dissent criticized the major-
ity's decision as permitting intrusions into the human body that were "un-
supported by any evidence of wrongdoing."
266
Having rejected the special needs rationale, the dissent applied Supreme
Court precedent evaluating drug testing under the traditional fourth amend-
ment reasonable search framework. 267 First, the dissent noted that a search
warrant is required before most government searches.268 Justice Marshall
acknowledged, however, that in some cases exigent circumstances exist that
259. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 637-38 (citing to New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 358, 359
n.3 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
260. Id. at 638.
261. Id.
262. Id. & nn.1-2. Justice Marshall failed to refer to Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979),
which did allow the most intricate body cavity search of prison inmates without even particu-
larized suspicion. Wolfish, however, is distinguishable from Skinner in that the Wolfish Court
failed to recognize fourth amendment rights in prison.
263. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 640-41.
264. Id. at 641.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 640.
267. Id. at 641-42. Justice Marshall used precedent to analyze the search. First, he looked
at whether a search had taken place. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Second, he
determined whether there was a valid exception to the search warrant requirement. Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984). Third, Justice Marshall questioned whether minimal intrusion
allowed a search based on less than probable cause. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200
(1979). Fourth, he decided whether the search was conducted in a reasonable manner. Win-
ston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
268. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 641-43.
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permit searches without obtaining a warrant. 269  Moreover, the dissent
found that collecting blood and urine samples while drug or alcohol traces
remain in body fluids fits within the criteria for the exigent circumstances
warrant waiver."' Thus, Justice Marshall agreed that requiring a warrant
prior to collecting body fluid samples might create a delay sufficient to
threaten the destruction of evidence.27' The dissent stressed, however, that
collecting body fluid samples prior to obtaining a warrant is not the same as
testing without a warrant. Justice Marshall concluded that, based on the
facts in Skinner, the exigency to justify drug testing without a search war-
rant did not exist.
272
In addition, Justice Marshall determined that the FRA regulations vio-
lated the fourth amendment's probable cause requirement. 273 The dissent
noted that probable cause is required when a search is highly intrusive.
2 74
Contrary to the majority's finding that the drug testing proved a minimal
intrusion into employees' privacy, Justice Marshall found the drug tests to
be so highly intrusive as to constitute a full-scale search, thus demanding a
showing of probable cause. 2 " Specifically, in response to the majority's as-
sertion that railroad employees' expectation of privacy is diminished because
they work in a highly regulated industry, Justice Marshall pointed out that
other Supreme Court cases using the same rationale concerned the search of
an employer's property, not the search of an employee's person.276 Further,
Justice Marshall asserted that the minimal privacy interest referred to by the
majority involved substantial interference in a customarily personal and pri-
vate function. 77 Moreover, the dissent recognized that, apart from the
269. Id. at 642-43. For a brief discussion of the exigent circumstances exception to search
warrant requirements, see supra note 83.
270. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 642.
271. Id. (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966)).
272. Id. at 642.43.
273. Id. at 643.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 644-46. The majority stated that blood testing is as commonplace as a routine
physical exam and the procedure imposes virtually no risk or pain on the person being tested.
Id. at 625 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)). Note, however, that while
the majority relied on Schmerber to find blood and urine tests reasonable absent reasonable
suspicion, there was probab!e cause in Schmerber. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768. In fact, the
officer had sufficient probable cause to arrest the petitioner for driving under the influence. Id.
276. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 648 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,
436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978)). Although the Supreme Court has never before recognized a dimin-
ished expectation of privacy in the employees' persons, the Third Circuit, in Shoemaker v.
Handel, recognized such a diminished expectation of privacy in the historically heavily regu-
lated horse racing industry. 795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986).
For discussion of Shoemaker, see supra notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
277. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 647 (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
816 F.2d 170. 175 (5th Cir. 1987) aj'd in part, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)). Justice Marshall quoted
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strong privacy interests implicated in collecting body fluids, chemical analy-
sis of these body fluids implicates equally strong privacy interests.2 8 Specifi-
cally, the dissent pointed out that through chemical analysis, railroad
officials can uncover not only drug or alcohol use, but also private medical
conditions such as epilepsy, diabetes, and clinical depression.279
Finally, Justice Marshall dismissed seriatim the majority opinion's two
final rationales.2 80 First, Justice Marshall questioned the majority's asser-
tion that testing employees after an accident would deter alcohol and drug
use.2 8 ' The dissent argued that "[i]t is ... the fear of the accident, not the
fear of a post-accident revelation, that deters., 282 Second, the dissent deter-
mined that an interest in diagnosing the cause of an accident, and possibly a
crime, did not justify departing from fourth amendment requirements.
283
IV. SPECIAL NEEDS EXCEPTION: INTO THE ATTIC
The special needs exception, as it is tailored to apply to drug testing em-
ployees, belongs in the attic next to other ill-suited case law.28 4 The special
needs exception permits the government to extend the administrative inspec-
tion exception to the warrant requirement to the search of a person's body
by way of blood and urine testing. While the administrative inspection al-
lows government officials to dispense with a search warrant, the fourth
amendment still requires the government to show some reasonable suspicion
to legitimize the search. 285 The creation of the special needs exception, how-
from the identical passage the majority quoted to prove why compulsory urination constituted
a search. Id. Justice Marshall observed that the majority relied on this quote to prove there
was a search, yet dismissed it when concluding there was a minimal privacy interest. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.; see also 53 Fed. Reg. 47,106 (1988) (the Epilepsy Foundation of America opposed
random testing as an unacceptable intrusion). If desired, railroad officials would also be able
to check female employees for pregnancy. In comparison, the companion case, National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), deals with a drug testing pro-
gram that allows testing only for specified drugs and requires the employee to disclose personal
medical information only upon a positive test result. Id. at 673 n.2.
280. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 652-53.
281. Id. at 653. Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, also rejected the deterrence
rationale. For a summary of his reasoning, see supra note 253.
282. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 653.
283. Id. at 654.
284. Justice Marshall referred to the Court's historical mistakes that seemed to happen
most often during real or perceived emergency situations. Justice Marshall pointed to some
extreme curtailments of liberty during the World War II relocation camp cases in Hirabayashi
v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 635 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Consequently, some argue that America is
currently in another emergency situation, referred to as a war on drugs. See supra note 8 and
accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 91-164 and accompanying text (discussing the administrative search).
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ever, allows a full-scale search without a warrant based on little, if any,
showing of probable cause.
Supreme Court cases dealing with administrative inspections purportedly
protect the victim from certain regulatory violations. 286 For example, under
OSHA regulations, employees were considered the victims of regulatory vio-
lations, and therefore, the government searches focused on employers' work-
places, where harm to employees had the potential to occur.2 " Thus, the
historical underpinnings of administrative searches conducted on employers'
premises provide the backdrop for the Supreme Court's Skinner decision.28 8
The Skinner Court, however, extends the administrative search exception to
the employee, converting the employee into the object of the search.28 9
The fact that the FRA's drug and alcohol testing regulations allow the use
of test results in criminal proceedings and convictions further implicates the
potential dangers of this new-found governmental power. 29 The FRA pro-
vides, "[t]est results indicating non-medical use of controlled substances are
not subject to any recognized privacy interest.",29 ' The Court, in Skinner
and in prior special needs cases, recognized the special needs exception to
the warrant and probable cause requirements because the circumstances of
the case indicated a need " 'beyond the normal need for law enforcement' "
which justified the search.29 2 Neither the Skinner Court nor the FRA regu-
lations, however, provide adequate guidelines for distinguishing between an
FRA search based on the public's interest in railroad safety and an FRA
search based on the public's ordinary law enforcement interest in deterring
illegal drug use. The public's interest is sufficient to justify application of the
286. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (Federal Mine Safety & Health Act of
1977 requiring inspections of surface and underground mines): Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436
U.S. 307 (1978) (Occupational Safety and Health Act requiring inspections of workplaces for
safety hazards).
287. Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 309 & n.I.
288. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 258-66 and accompanying text.
290. 49 C.F.R. § 219.21 i(d) (1989) (samples available to parties in litigation); see also 53
Fed. Reg. 47,129 (1988) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. § 219.607) (records of positive test results
to be retained for at least two years and summary records of test results to be maintained for at
least five years); 53 Fed. Reg. 47,118 (1988) (test results available to government inquiry or
discovery request). In comparison, the drug testing program in the companion case, National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), allows for test results to be used
in a criminal prosecution of the employee only upon the employee's written consent. Id. at
663. The Court in Von Raab viewed the drug testing program as a means of deterring drug use
in sensitive drug interdiction positions and not as a means of prosecuting drug users. Id. at
666.
291. 53 Fed. Reg. 47,118 (1988); see also supra note 279.
292. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (quoting Griffin
v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351
(1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring))).
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several needs exceptions to the fourth amendment's warrant and probable
cause requirements; the ordinary law enforcement interest, however, would
presumably fall within certain fourth amendment warrant and probable
cause requirements.29 Under the Skinner decision, if the government can
disguise a search as one falling within the special needs exception, the gov-
ernment may bypass the warrant and probable cause requirements.
294
Moreover, the type of testing permitted in Skinner is analogous to the
various types of inspections permitted in a military context. Despite the mil-
itary court's upholding compulsory urine testing, it has found that all inspec-
tions on military bases are searches requiring compliance with the fourth
amendment. 295 The military court, however, has also recognized that differ-
ent types of inspections require different levels of fourth amendment scru-
tiny. Specifically, the military court has delineated two levels of inspections:
"fitness" inspections and "shakedown" inspections. 296 Fitness inspections
are performed to evaluate the readiness of persons or equipment,297 but mili-
tary officers perform shakedown inspections to find evidence for criminal
prosecution.29 The military court has held that warrantless shakedown in-
spections violate the fourth amendment's reasonableness standard. 299  Be-
293. The Court, although finding that broadly interpreted statutes might authorize using
test results for criminal prosecutions, did not find this was the intended use. Id. at 621 n.5.
The Court found insufficient evidence to establish a pretext for allowing criminal prosecution
based upon test results and chose not to address whether a pretext would exist were test results
routinely used in criminal prosecutions. Id.
294. The Skinner Court left unanswered the question of whether officers' repeated use of
the administrative inspections' drug testing results to prosecute employees would infer a pre-
text, thus challenging the administrative inspection. However, from the decision in Skinner,
one could deduce that any challenge to the administrative search and special needs exception
would be struck down by this Court. See Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics:
Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV 383, 408 (1988) (predicting
what eventually came to pass in Skinner). But compare the companion case National Treas-
ury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), where the same-day Court held that
one factor in determining the reasonableness of the Customs Service drug-testing program was
that the program prohibits test results used in criminal investigations or convictions. Id. at
666; see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (noting that the police cannot act
upon less evidence by avoiding a magistrate); supra note 194 (the Wyman Court found reason-
ableness in part because a caseworker was inspecting to assist, rather than an officer to crimi-
nally investigate).
295. United States v. Roberts, 2 M.J. 31 (C.M.A. 1976). Even on a military base where
inspections are generally considered reasonable, the need for military preparedness did not
render a middle-of-the-night barracks inspection with marijuana detection dogs as reasonable
within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
296. Id. at 34-36.
297. Id. at 36.
298. Id. at 35-36.
299. Id. at 36.
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cause the FRA regulations are based on post-accident testing,3°° these tests
do not conform to the definition of a fitness inspection to determine employ-
ees' readiness to perform a specific job.30  Rather, these post-accident tests
are more in line with a shakedown inspection to investigate for cause and to
collect criminal evidence. 3 2 As Justice Marshall noted in his dissent, the
FRA conceded that urine tests cannot measure current impairment; they
can only measure drug or alcohol use within the last two months. 3  Thus,
testing pursuant to the FRA regulations would seem to invoke some of the
same concerns as a military shakedown inspection, namely, that drug testing
functions more as a person identification process than as an impairment de-
tection process.3 ° 4
Employee drug testing programs can be reasonable within the meaning of
the fourth amendment, provided they have adequate safeguards to ensure
reasonableness and to substitute sufficiently for the warrant requirement.
The government has taken just such measures with employee searches
through polygraph tests and other searches through wiretapping. 30 5 Similar
safeguards could be created for employee drug testing.
Private sector employees will now encounter the issue of mandatory drug
testing in a myriad of situations. Already, such situations as treatment of
300. 49 C.F.R. § 219.201 (1989).
301. See infra note 304 and accompanying text.
302. See supra note 290.
303. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 652 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing); see 49 C.F.R. § 219.309(b)(2).
304. Identification processes for classifying people have been used throughout history. One
of the most infamous identification processes ever used was the Nazi process for identifying
Jews. See, e.g.. Y. BAUER, A HISTORY OF THE HOLOCAUST (1982). The Nazis identified
"non-Aryan" descendants using religious criteria. Id. at 100; see also L. DAWIDOWICZ, THE
WAR AGAINST THE JEWS 1933-1945 59-60 (1986) (identification of non-Aryans based upon
racial determination or religious affiliation); A. KAHN, THE MATUSOW AFFAIR (1987) (identi-
fication of communist party members).
305. Wiretapping was considered such an invasion of privacy that Congress felt the need to
enact legislation under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 regulating use
and preventing abuse of electronic surveillance. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 801-02, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2520 (1988)). The Senate cited two main purposes: to protect privacy of wire and
oral communications and to create uniform requirements for allowing such searches based
upon authorization of court order after a showing and finding of probable cause. S. Rep. No.
1097, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2112, 2153-
56. As with wiretapping, Congress determined that polygraph tests were such an invasion of
privacy that they required regulation through legislation. The Employee Polygraph Protection
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-347, 102 Stat. 646 (to be codified at'29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009).
The legislation permits the use of polygraph testing in ongoing theft investigations only where
there is a showing of reasonable suspicion. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 659, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 4,
reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 726, 751.
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job-related injuries trigger mandatory drug tests °.3  The National Labor Re-
lations Board ruled that any type of mandatory drug and alcohol testing is a
valid factor for collective bargaining.10 7 The labor unions that compel col-
lective bargaining agreements to resolve the reasonableness of mandatory
drug tests will have to share in the responsibility of protecting against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, a burden once relegated exclusively to the
fourth amendment. Many employees, however, who are not protected by
collective bargaining agreements, will not be able to share in determining the
scope of mandatory drug testing in the workplace. Thus, after Skinner, non-
union employees will remain the most vulnerable to intrusions on their pri-
vacy interests through mandatory drug tests.
V. CONCLUSION
Skinner extends the special needs exception to the warrant and probable
cause requirements from searching objects to searching persons by way of
blood and urine tests. The Court's decision reflects current public concern
over the nation's epidemic of illegal drug use. In addition, the Court's deci-
sion allows the government great deference in dealing with this crisis. Spe-
cifically, Skinner allows the government to take whatever steps necessary to
effect drug reform. To date, the government is still testing the extent of the
Supreme Court's deference3 °8
By applying a special needs exception to the FRA employee drug testing
regulations, Skinner provides the means by which the government can con-
duct a suspicionless human body search and use the evidence for possible
criminal prosecution. If the Skinner decision were based solely on the bal-
ancing standard of reasonableness, then each employee drug test would still
require balancing the intrusiveness of the search against the government's
interest. The special needs exception allows a determination of whether a
search is reasonable based upon a special need. Thus, where the balancing
standard involves a determination of whether the search is reasonable at its
306. See Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 1988-1989 NLRB Dec. (CCH)
15,555 (June 15, 1989). "The disposition of... litigation involving random testing of [air,]
trucking, sea and rail transport workers will ultimately affect over 4 million private sector
employees." Stanley, Drug Law, Nat'l L. J., Oct. 16, 1989, at 20, 21 col. 3.
307. Johnson-Bateman, 1988-1989 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 15,555 at 29,2224-25.
308. On August 1, 1989, the Senate approved, by a vote of 55 to 45, an amendment spon-.
sored by Senators McConnell and Kerry allowing federal law enforcement officials authority to
shoot down small planes suspected of drug smuggling. United States Senate News Release
(Aug. 1, 1989). On February 1, 1990, the U.S. Coast Guard fired upon a cuban cargo
freighter, which was carrying only chrome, while in international waters. A U.S. Coast Guard
spokesman stated that "U.S. authorities had no concrete evidence that the freighter was carry-
ing drugs but it 'fit the profile'." Washington Post, February 2, 1990, at A16, col. 5.
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inception and whether the search is reasonably related in scope to the pur-
pose for the government's initial intrusion, the special need addresses only
whether the search is reasonable at its inception.
An employee drug testing program can be reasonable where adequate
safeguards exist to comply with fourth amendment requirements. But where
adequate safeguards do not exist, the onus rests on employee unions to pro-
tect against unreasonable searches and seizures, leaving nonunion employees
vulnerable to unreasonable searches. Regardless, the special needs excep-
tion, when applied to an employee drug testing program, has no place in
fourth amendment search and seizure.
Loree L. French

